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Executive Summary
This policy brief examines whether the pes-
simism that recently gripped the financial mar-
kets about Brazil’s economic prospects is justi-
fied, and whether the big IMF program in sup-
port of Brazil announced on August 8, 2002, is
likely to succeed in turning the tide. It concludes
that present policies would be adequate to se-
cure a gradual reduction in the debt/GDP ratio
given return of the exchange rate to a less un-
dervalued level and a level of interest rates that
is normal by past Brazilian standards though still
high by world standards, though not under the
recent conditions of a severely undervalued real
and astronomical interest rates. It also concludes
that the strongly improving trend recently evident
in Brazilian trade promises a progressive reduc-
tion in external vulnerability, though this again
could be jeopardized by the maintenance of sky-
high interest rates. It then argues that, despite
the mixed records of the two principal opposition
candidates for the presidency, neither would be
likely to choose a policy of deliberately reneging
on Brazil’s debts. That being so, the recent mar-
ket turbulence has to be interpreted as a panic
in which even those convinced that Brazil’s fun-
damentals are sound did not dare to speculate
in favor of restoration of normality. Such situa-
tions are exactly those where the IMF can play a
useful role in breaking a panic, and hence the
new loan much improves the chances of Brazil
avoiding the implosion that would be likely to
follow a debt restructuring.
Introduction
Until the IMF package on August 7, the
financial markets showed great concern
that Brazil might follow Russia, Ecuador,
the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries, and
Argentina in defaulting on its public debt.
The yield spread of Brazilian debt over US
Treasury securities (“Brazil risk”) rose above
2,000 basis points in July 2002, on some
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days higher than that of Nigerian debt, and second
only to Argentina. One of my colleagues, Morris
Goldstein, publicly estimated the probability of a Bra-
zilian debt restructuring before the end of 2003 to
be as high as 70 percent. After that (though not nec-
essarily as a consequence!) the Brazilian real depre-
ciated a lot more and Brazil risk rose much more.
The questions addressed in this brief are whether
this pessimism about the prospects of Brazil was
justified, and whether the new IMF program an-
nounced on August 7, 2002, promises to bring these
fears to an end once and for all.
The first section of the brief lays out the analyti-
cal framework that will be used to examine this ques-
tion. This is the theory of the self-fulfilling crisis.
This theory argues that there are circumstances in
which, if the markets believe the debt will be ser-
viced, then it will be possible to service it (the coun-
try will be in a “good equilibrium”); if they do not,
then maintaining debt service will be impossible (the
country will be in a “bad equilibrium”1). Such a situ-
ation can arise where a country’s fundamentals are
in an intermediate situation—i.e., they are strong
enough to service the debt in the “good equilibrium”
but are unable to service it in the “bad equilibrium.”
The brief therefore asks whether Brazil’s fundamen-
tals are in fact in this intermediate situation, in re-
gard to both the domestic and the external debt, and
concludes that this is indeed a legitimate character-
ization of the country’s present position. Since the
market’s choice between focusing on the good ver-
sus bad equilibrium is influenced by the political
situation in Brazil, this is the topic of the next sec-
tion. The concluding section discusses the prospects
of avoiding the catastrophe of yet another debt-in-
duced economic implosion, and asks what both Brazil
and the international community, including the fi-
nancial markets, could do to reduce the chances of
this occurring.
1. The Theory of Multiple Equilibria
Traditionally economists have thought in terms
of models that were assumed without much analy-
sis to have a single equilibrium. When Paul Krugman
(1979) first formalized the analysis of foreign ex-
change crises, he constructed a model in which a
country’s policy of fixing the exchange rate was un-
sustainable because the government was running a
budget deficit that could not be financed without
monetary expansion, and eventually the market was
bound to recognize that the monetary expansion was
inconsistent with a fixed exchange rate. At some
point, which under his ideal assumptions would be
when a run on the currency would exactly exhaust
the country’s foreign exchange reserves, the market
would therefore force a change in policy. This “first-
generation” crisis model thus predicted exactly when
a crisis would occur, with no room for the psychol-
ogy of market players beyond the customary trivial
assumption that they are out for number one.
The “second-generation” crisis models introduced
by Maurice Obstfeld (1985) were very different. They
posited instead that there were situations in which
the outcome would be determined by the market,
with either of two (or maybe more) equilibria being
indefinitely sustainable. For example, if the market
had never challenged sterling’s parity of DM 2.95 =
£1 in the ERM, perhaps the UK current account
deficit that resulted from that exchange rate could
have been financed without an unsustainable
buildup of foreign debt. But once sufficient market
operators came to doubt whether that parity was
sustainable, they all shifted out, and that portfolio
shift was sufficient to exhaust the reserves and thus
forced the authorities to allow the pound to depreci-
ate. (A variant of the model acknowledges that there
may have been policy measures that could have
averted devaluation, but argues that these would
have been even more unpalatable to the authorities
than devaluation.) The current account consistent
with the pound’s new depreciated level could again
be financed in a way that appeared indefinitely sus-
tainable. There were thus two possible equilibrium
positions (often referred to as “good” and “bad”), and
which got chosen was a matter of market psychol-
ogy rather than the laws of economics. (George
Soros’s theory of reflexivity is also an attempt to come
to terms with the fact that outcomes can depend on
opinions and their trajectory through time rather
than simply objective circumstances, see Soros
2000.)
It is widely held that the possibility of multiple
equilibria exists only within a certain range of the
1. I will conform to customary usage in describing this as a bad
equilibrium, though it might be more accurate to describe it as
a bad outcome, for it is not obvious that there would have been
any sort of equilibrium available had things continued to
deteriorate.
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“fundamentals.” If the fundamentals are very strong,
then the authorities will have no difficulty in de-
fending the good equilibrium (e.g., a fixed exchange
rate) even if it were to be subjected to a speculative
attack. If, conversely, the fundamentals are very
weak, then it will be impossible for them to defend
the rate even without a speculative attack. It is only
with the fundamentals in some intermediate range
that the possibility of multiple equilibria arises, and
it is within this range that speculative attacks may
occur and that their outcome is open to doubt.
The question in the Brazilian context is whether
the fundamentals lie in that intermediate range
where it would be perfectly feasible for Brazil to con-
tinue servicing its debt if the market offers reason-
able terms, and impossible for it to do so if the mar-
ket demands other terms that lie within the plau-
sible range of what it might ask. To answer that
question, it is necessary to examine both the viabil-
ity of the government servicing its public debt and
the country earning enough dollars to maintain the
service of its foreign debt. If both would be possible
under normal market conditions, then we can say
that the existing fundamentals are consistent with
existence of a “good equilibrium.” If either of them
would be impossible under a plausible alternative
set of conditions, then it follows that a “bad equilib-
rium” is also possible. To make the analysis explicit,
we will examine whether Brazil would be able to
service both the public debt and its external debt in
a nonexplosive way under the conditions that the
market is currently imposing, where “currently”
should be interpreted as August 8, 2002.
The next two sections of this brief therefore ad-
dress the question of whether the range of market
conditions from normal to current is consistent with
the existence of both good and bad equilibria. A good
equilibrium is one in which the country can con-
tinue to service its debt without a further increase
in the burden of debt and on the basis of the current
and prospective fundamentals. Conversely, a bad
equilibrium is one in which this is not possible, for
either or both the public and/or the external debt.
There are three crucial market-determined conditions
that are relevant here: (a) the real/dollar exchange
rate (R$2.92 per dollar on August 8, 2002); (b) “Bra-
zil risk”, the risk premium over US Treasuries on
Brazilian sovereign bonds (1,759 basis points on
August 8, 2002); and (c) the willingness of foreign
banks to continue rolling over their credit lines to
the Brazilian corporate sector.
The fundamentals relate to the inherited debt
stocks, the growth rate of the economy, the Brazil-
ian rate of inflation, the equilibrium exchange rate
of the Brazilian real, the world interest rate, the pri-
mary fiscal surplus, and the noninterest current
account balance. The assumptions made about these
variables are laid out in table 1, and the figures cho-
sen are discussed in the appendix A. Note that it will
be assumed that these variables are invariant to
whether the market chooses the good or bad equilib-
rium. This is doubtless unrealistic: for example, it is
               Table 1  Assumptions regarding Brazilian fundamentals
Debt stocks
    Public-sector external debt (net of reserves)                 $56 billion
    Private-sector external debt            $120 billion
    Total external debt            $176 billion
    Public-sector domestic debt (R$2.92/dollar)          R$677 billion
    Total public-sector debt          R$841 billion
Other variables
     2002 GDP       R$1,265 billion
     Trend growth rate (percent per year)                4
     Inflation rate (percent per year) 3.5
     Equilibrium exchange rate (reais per dollar)                    1.9-2.5
     Primary fiscal surplus (percent of GDP)                               3.75
     Noninterest current account balance
(percent of GDP)          -0.2 in 2002
                                                                           + 1.7  in 2003
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difficult indeed to imagine that the Brazilian economy
would grow at the same rate, which is assumed to
be 4 percent per year, if the bad equilibrium were to
occur. But that would simply serve to make the bad
equilibrium even worse; it could not conceivably
transform a bad into a good equilibrium. It is only if
we were to find that a bad equilibrium were not pos-
sible on the basis of current market conditions and
the figures chosen for the fundamentals that we
would need to worry that this source of bias might
undermine our conclusions.
Without more ado, we proceed to examine Bra-
zilian debt dynamics. The next section deals with
the domestic public debt, and the one following that
with the external debt situation. In both cases we
are interested in examining whether it is plausible
to suppose that the market could choose either a
good or a bad equilibrium.
2. Public-Debt Dynamics
The debt of the Brazilian public sector has in-
creased rapidly in recent years and is now substan-
tial. Table 2 shows both the gross debt of the con-
solidated public sector (since the series started in
1998) and the official concept of net debt from 1994
to June 2002, and net debt so defined as a percent-
age of GDP. It can be seen that the latter exploded
from a modest 30 percent of GDP in 1994 to 59 per-
cent in June 2002. Moreover, there is no sign of any
slowdown in its rate of growth: on the contrary, the
growth in July 2002 must surely have set a record.
A glance at these numbers suggests that the market
had reason to be worried about the sustainability of
Brazilian public finances.
Moreover, it can be argued (see, for example,
Favero and Giavazzi 2002) that the official concept
of net debt is too low. This is because some of the
claims of the Brazilian government that are netted
out are of doubtful liquidity. Favero and Giavazzi
quantify these claims of doubtful liquidity as
amounting to some 12 percent of GDP, or R$150
billion. Although Goldfajn (2002) defends the net-
ting out of these claims on the ground that they are
not necessarily of lower quality than those (such as
the bank deposits of the public sector) that every-
one agrees should be netted out, he concedes that
these claims are less liquid. I propose to strike an
expedient middle path by not deducting those pub-
lic-sector claims that carry a long-term fixed inter-
est rate (principally claims on BNDES), which
amounted to R$71 billion at the end of June. That
leaves an estimate of net debt of R$821 billion at
the end of June 2002. The growth of debt in the
month of July and, more important, the impact of
the depreciation of the real, take this figure up to
R$841 billion (66 percent of GDP) as an estimate for
August 8.
It can be argued that even this figure may be
too low, because there may be more “skeletons” to
come out of the closet in the coming years. “Skel-
etons” are claims on the public sector that are not
currently shown on its books. One major way in
which they may still arise in the future, even if
Goldfajn (2002) is right in arguing that the govern-
ment has done a good job of cleaning up skeletons
in the last few years, is by contingent liabilities ma-
terializing. Goldfajn quantifies about 10 percentage
points of the rise in the debt/GDP ratio of the past
Table 2  The consolidated debt of the Brazilian public
              sector, 1994-2002 (billions of reais)
      Net (percent
Gross Net          of GDP)
1994 n.a. 153 30.0
1995 n.a. 208 30.6
1996 n.a. 269 33.3
1997 n.a. 308 34.4
1998 507 386 41.7
1999 621 517 49.2
2000 745 563 49.4
2001 885 661 53.3
June 2002     1,000 750 58.6
n.a. =  not available
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eight years as having been due to recognition of hid-
den liabilities (“skeletons”), and guesses that they
may add something over another 5 percentage points
in the coming six years. It is reported by Favero and
Giavazzi that some market operators have guessed
higher numbers (they mention a JPMorgan figure
as high as another 10 percent of GDP), but these
seem doubtful in view of the plaudits that the IMF
gave to Brazil for fiscal transparency in its Report
on the Observance of Standards and Codes (IMF
2001). I propose to follow Goldfajn’s approach of
assuming that new skeletons of 0.75 percent of GDP
will be recognized each year (and 1.61 percent of
GDP in 2002).
This debt is far from homogeneous. In the first
place, some of it is external debt and some is inter-
nal debt. The external debt amounted to $98 billion
at the end of July 2002, from which one needs to
net off $42 billion of international reserves, to give
a net external debt of the public sector of $56 bil-
lion. At an exchange rate of R$2.92 per dollar, that
amounts to R$164 billion, as shown in table 3. That
table also shows R$677 billion for the domestic debt.
The total estimate for the partially netted concept of
debt being used amounts to R$841 billion, or 66
percent of GDP.
The memorandum items in table 3 show how
the debt is broken down into components whose cost
depends on different parameters. First, some 42 per-
cent of the debt is dollar-linked. This comprises all
the external debt and a significant part of the do-
mestic debt as well. The cost of this component of
the debt is the nominal interest rate on dollar-de-
nominated debt, which averages about 9 percent,
plus the rate of depreciation of the real in terms of
the dollar. A second component of the domestic debt
has an interest rate that is linked to the Selic (the
overnight interest rate that is set by the Banco Cen-
tral do Brasil). A substantial part of the debt is in-
deed held in overnight form and receives the Selic
rate itself, while the remainder of this second com-
ponent is held at longer maturities, up to two years,
and receives a term premium that varies both with
maturity and over time. Favero and Giavazzi (2002)
find that the term premia vary closely with the risk
premium on Brady bonds (“Brazil risk”), but per-
haps surprisingly it is not expected that the cost of
the Selic-linked debt will much exceed the Selic this
year, because most of the term debt has already
been issued. Part of the debt is held at interest rates
that are fixed at the time the debt is issued, but the
cost of this debt also seems to vary closely (though
presumably with a lag) with the Selic, so it (as well
as a small residual component) is aggregated with
the Selic-linked debt for purposes of analysis. An-
other part of the domestic debt is held in inflation-
linked bonds, and receives an average real interest
rate of about 7.5 percent per year.
The increase in the nominal value of the public
debt is equal to the sum of the cost of these various
components, minus the nominal value of the pri-
mary budget surplus. Since I have netted out some
Table 3  Composition of Brazilian public-sector debt (August 8, 2002)
              (assuming R$2.92 = $1)
Billion  Percent of
      reais               net debt
External debt, gross 286
International reserves 123
External debt, net 164   20
Domestic debt, net 677   80
Total net debt 841 100
Memorandum items:
Total dollar-denominated debt 354   42
Selic-linked domestic debt 310   37
Plus “other” 380   45
Inflation-linked domestic debt   66     8
Zero-interest debt   41     5
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of the assets of the government in calculating the
size of the debt, I need to add the income on those
assets to the official measure of the primary surplus
in order to get a correct measure of the surplus for
use in this analysis. Those assets are valued at about
R$71 billion and pay an average interest rate of about
8 percent, so the primary surplus needs to be aug-
mented by R$5.6 billion, or 0.45 percent of GDP.
The change in the debt/GDP ratio is equal to the
percentage increase in the debt minus the increase
in nominal GDP, which is increased by both infla-
tion (as measured by the GDP deflator) and real
growth.
Table 4 shows how to calculate the change in
the value of public-sector debt, and thence the
change in the debt/GDP ratio. The table presents
estimates for both 2002 and a normal “medium-run”
year, meaning years beyond the current one assum-
ing there is no collapse. I use the nominal values of
2003 for purposes of calculating nominal values, but
this should not materially affect the outcome in terms
of percentage changes.
The cost of dollar-linked debt is equal to the av-
erage nominal interest rate on dollar-denominated
debt, about 9 percent, plus the depreciation of the
real in terms of the dollar. Given the assumption
that the real will remain at R$2.92 per dollar for the
rest of the year 2002, plus the fact that it started
the year at R$2.31 per dollar, this cost is the nomi-
nal interest rate plus a whopping 26.4 percent, giv-
ing an interest bill of R$106 billion. Selic-linked debt
has this year been costing between 18 and 19 per-
cent, and inflation-linked debt about 15 percent.
The total interest cost (including the effect of the
depreciation of the real) in 2002 is estimated as
R$176 billion, which vastly exceeds the expected
augmented primary surplus of R$53 billion. Given
another R$20 billion worth of skeletons, the debt is
thus expected to increase by 20 percent, which sub-
stantially exceeds the 7.6 percent expected infla-
tion, thus implying an 11 percent increase in the
real value of the debt and a 9 percent increase in
the debt/GDP ratio despite the substantial primary
surplus. This looks scary, and if anything like this
were to be perpetuated into the future, then the situ-
ation would not be viable.
It is even possible to envisage some consider-
ations that might increase these costs. In particu-
lar, if external debt had to be rolled over at any-
thing like the interest rate implied by the current
spread on Brazilian Brady bonds, then the nominal
interest rate on dollar-denominated debt would ex-
plode. About $5.5 billion of public-sector external
debt falls due next year (other than to the interna-
tional organizations), which implies that the cost of
external debt service would increase by about $700
million (over R$2 billion) a year after just one year.
Under these circumstances the Brazilian public-sec-
tor debt would be unsustainable without a big fur-
ther increase in the primary surplus. It is thus pos-
Table 4  The dynamics of Brazilian public-sector debt
          2002     Medium run
Cost of dollar-linked debt:
  Percent 35            7.7
  Billion reais            106                    31
Cost of Selic-linked debt:
   Percent 19 17
   Billion reais 60 68
Cost of inflation-linked debt:
   Percent 15 11
   Billion reais 10   8
Total cost (billion reais)            176            107
  Minus augmented primary surplus 53 56
  Plus skeletons             20 10
Equals decrease in debt (billion reais)            143 61
Percentage increase in debt 20             6.7
Percentage increase in real debt 11             3.1
Change in debt/GDP ratio   9            -0.9
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sible to construct a scenario for a bad equilibrium,
simply by postulating the perpetuation of present
market realities.
Consider next what might be a more normal set
of market realities. To begin with, in the long run
one should not expect continuous real depreciation
of the real. On the contrary, the real has already
much overshot equilibrium by every attempt to mea-
sure equilibrium of which I am aware (see appendix
A). Suppose therefore that instead of continuing to
depreciate, the real were to appreciate in real terms
gradually back to the most conservative estimate of
its equilibrium level, which is currently some R$2.50
per dollar. Assume this were to happen gradually
over five years. In this period the equilibrium level
would depreciate by the inflation differential between
Brazil and the United States; using Goldfajn’s fig-
ures for Brazilian inflation and assuming inflation
of 2.5 percent per year in the United States, this
would imply the weakest estimate of equilibrium for
the real would be R$2.74 per dollar. That would im-
ply appreciation of the real of 1.3 percent per year.
Then with the present nominal interest rate on dol-
lar-denominated debt, the interest cost of the dol-
lar-denominated portion of the debt would be only
some 7.7 percent per year, and the interest burden
“next year” would be R$31 billion.
Similarly, if “Brazil risk” fell from its current
2,060 basis points to the 700 basis points that the
Banco Central do Brasil is forecasting for the post-
election period, then the cost of the long-maturity
Selic-linked debt might be expected to decline, tak-
ing the average cost of Selic-linked debt down. I have
put in an estimated cost of 17 percent a year for the
Selic-linked debt in a “normal” year, on the grounds
that this was the actual cost in the noncrisis year
2000; it also happens to be close to Favero and
Giavazzi’s estimate of the equilibrium Selic rate
needed to keep inflation constant. And of course the
cost of the inflation-linked debt would decline in line
with the reduction in inflation from the 7.6 percent
expected this year to the 3.5 percent being targeted
in the medium term.
This still yields a hefty R$107 billion interest
bill. Together with the postulated skeletons, it out-
weighs the primary surplus by R$61 billion, enough
to still increase the debt by 6.7 percent. That then
still implies an increase in the real value of the
debt, of 3.1 percent, but the debt/GDP ratio would
decline marginally by 0.9 percent given growth of 4
percent.
The conclusion that the debt/GDP ratio would
decline in the medium term if normality were re-
stored can be checked by utilizing the shorthand
form of the analysis presented in table 4. This is
given by the well-known equation which summa-
rizes the condition for fiscal solvency as being that
in the long run the augmented primary surplus mi-
nus skeletons, S, must be at least as big as (r-g)(D/
Y), where r is the average real rate of interest on
the debt (D), g is the growth rate of the economy,
and D/Y is the ratio of debt to GDP (Y):
S $ (r-g)(D/Y). (1)
Given that D/Y is currently 0.66, a value of g equal
to 4 percent implies that the augmented primary
surplus of 4.2 percent minus skeletons of 0.75 per-
cent would be sufficient to avoid explosive debt dy-
namics provided that the average real interest rate
does not exceed 9.2 percent. While the Selic-linked
debt does not satisfy that condition, both the dol-
lar-linked and inflation-linked debt do, and by a
sufficient margin to reduce the weighted average
to 8.3 percent.
Goldfajn (2002) reaches a similar conclusion.
His baseline scenario has net debt/GDP declining
from 58 percent in May 2002 to 48 percent in 2011.
The assumptions are inflation and growth both at
3.5 percent for most of the period, an average real
interest rate of 9 percent on government debt, nomi-
nal currency depreciation of 2 percent a year, a
primary surplus of 3.75 percent of GDP, and rec-
ognition of skeletons amounting to just over 5 per-
cent of GDP over the coming years. He notes that
the shocks that could disturb his conclusions are
a higher real interest rate and a lower primary sur-
plus.
Favero and Giavazzi (2002) are less optimistic
that Brazil could achieve a declining debt/GDP ra-
tio without a further increase in the primary sur-
plus. Their calculations appear to differ from mine
in three major ways. First, they use a substantially
larger debt figure than Goldfajn or I do because
they net out 12 percent of GDP less from the pub-
lic-sector debt than him: I have followed them part
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way in this respect (I net out 6 percent less than
them but 6 percent more than Goldfajn and the offi-
cial figures). Second, they do not augment the pri-
mary surplus to allow for the income that the gov-
ernment receives on the assets that they have net-
ted out. Third, they project a continuing real depre-
ciation of the real for the years 2002-04. That of
course highlights the problem: unless the real re-
covers, Brazil’s debts will indeed be unsustainable.
It will end up in the “bad equilibrium.”
The question is obviously whether the market will
allow the real to recover further and interest rates to
fall enough to allow a good equilibrium to be estab-
lished. The fact is that the projections in table 4 im-
ply that the average real interest rate r for 2002 will
be around 15 percent, vastly above that which satis-
fies the sustainability condition (1). If the market
looks backward rather than forward, and extrapo-
lates that interest rate into the future, then it could
scare itself into the bad equilibrium that is inconsis-
tent with an improving debt situation.
These results suggest that Brazil is indeed in the
intermediate situation where either a good or a bad
equilibrium could be consistent with the fundamen-
tals. Someone trying to deny the possibility of the
bad equilibrium might argue that the market cannot
possibly extrapolate the 2002 depreciation of the real
into the future. This challenge would be more per-
suasive if one did not recall that it is only a matter of
months since the levitation of the dollar, and the US
stock market, were widely believed in the market to
be permanent because they resulted from structural
changes, rather than the bubbles that most people
agree in retrospect they were. The fact is that most
market participants operate without any concept of
equilibrium in their minds, so that the markets can
go off on errant paths for prolonged periods without
any self-correcting forces being set in motion. Even-
tually reality catches up, of course, but that is scant
comfort if disaster can occur before this happens.
Someone denying the possibility of a good equilib-
rium would probably point to the fact that I am as-
suming that the real will recover and assert that for-
eign exchange rates are unforecastable, which is true
in the short run but not, I would maintain, in the
long run when they are as clearly misaligned as the
real is now.
In short, I see little reason to doubt that Brazil is
in the intermediate situation so far as its internal
debt dynamics are concerned.
3. External Debt Sustainability
While most recent analytical work has focused
on the sustainability of public-sector debt, most ana-
lysts (e.g., Cline 1984) during the 1980s debt crisis
focused instead on whether debtor countries would
earn enough foreign exchange to be able to service
their foreign debt. Critics argued that it was a mis-
take to overlook the public finance issue posed by
possible unsustainable debt dynamics. That was a
legitimate criticism, but it is equally a mistake to
ignore the issue of whether a country is going to
earn enough foreign exchange to be able to main-
tain external debt service. A country’s position is
unsustainable unless it is able both to service its
public-sector debt without this exploding and to
service its external debt under likely future condi-
tions. (Since countries do not have captive markets
for their external debt, the issue of the debt explod-
ing does not generally arise.) In this section we there-
fore examine the prospects for Brazil’s external ac-
counts.
Brazil’s foreign debt is estimated as some $176
billion. This includes $56 billion of net external debt
of the public sector, i.e. $98 billion gross, minus
$42 billion of international reserves. The private
sector’s debt is estimated to be some $120 billion.
The assets of the private sector are also believed to
be very substantial, at least $70 billion and possi-
bly as much as $170 billion, so that the private
sector may conceivably be in a net creditor position
vis-à-vis the rest of the world. However, these as-
sets are not netted off, since they are not accessible
to the authorities to sustain the payment of debt
service. The official figure results in a ratio of exter-
nal debt to GDP of 41 percent, which is fairly high
(but that is partly because the real is undervalued),
and a ratio of debt to exports of 326 percent, which
is high by any standards. The debt service ratio
(interest plus profit remittances plus amortization
divided by exports) is an astronomical 91 percent.
In addition to the debts it owes to the rest of the
world, there is a large volume of foreign direct in-
vestment in Brazil. In 2001 the country paid al-
most $5 billion in profits and dividends on this in-
vestment. Nevertheless, the value of this investment
is not counted as part of Brazil’s foreign debt, and
this is appropriate. This is because profit remit-
tances have to compete with imports and other non-
contractual payments for foreign exchange, whereas
I see little reason to doubt that
Brazil is in the intermediate
situation [one of multiple
equilibria] so far as its internal
debt dynamics are concerned.   August 2002 PB 02-7 9
interest and amortization payments on debt are con-
tractual payments that the country is obliged to
make irrespective of competing claims for dollars. If
the real depreciates, then this will automatically
squeeze how many dollars direct investors will need
to buy to remit their profits abroad, while it will not
affect how many dollars are needed for debt service.
Policymakers need to worry about whether their
country has enough dollars to pay debt service, even
more than the pressure on the currency caused by
attempts of direct investors to remit (or hedge) their
profits.
The most recent figures for Brazil’s balance of
payments, with results up to June 2002, are shown
in table 5. The first column shows the outcome for
2001. The next two columns allow a comparison of
the outcomes for the first half of 2001 and 2002.
The fourth column shows the outcome for the 12
months to June 2002.
It can be seen that the current account is on an
improving trend, as one would expect given the re-
cent depreciation of the real. It is true that this owes
more to import compression than to a boom in ex-
ports, but even this is not too surprising given not
only that there is a world recession but also that the
imports of one of Brazil’s main trading partners,
namely Argentina, have imploded in 2002 (they have
fallen by over 60 percent). In fact, Brazil’s exports to
Argentina declined by $1.3 billion in the first four
months of 2002 compared to the corresponding
months of 2001. An overall improvement in the cur-
rent account of $10 billion at an annual rate is there-
fore quite impressive.
The penultimate column offers a conservative
projection of the balance of payments outcome in
2002. The current account deficit is almost entirely
accounted for by the interest bill, and is projected at
$15 billion, 3.5 percent of GDP. It is expected that it
Table 5  Brazilian balance of payments (billions of US dollars)
2001  2002       12 months to    2002        “2003”
 2001     Jan/June    Jan/June     June 2002   projection    projection
Trade balance    2.64  -0.08    2.61      5.33         7        15
  Exports  58.22 28.93  25.05    54.35
  Imports  55.58 29.00  22.44    49.02
Services and income -27.49       -14.04         -11.81         -25.26
  Net interests payments              -14.88  -7.46          -6.53  -13.94      -14
  Profits and dividends   -4.96  -2.61  -2.77    -5.13        -5        -5
  International travel   -1.47  -0.88  -0.55    -1.14        -1        -1
  Other   -6.19 -3.10  -1.97    -5.06        -4        -3
Unilateral transfers    1.64   0.78   0.92     1.78         2         2
Current account -23.21       -13.34  -8.28  -18.15      -15
  Noninterest current account   -8.33  -5.88  -1.75    -4.21        -1         8
Capital and financial account  27.92 16.19 14.70   26.43
  Foreign direct investment  22.46   9.90   9.62   22.18
  Other    5.47   6.29   5.08     4.26
Global result of the balance
    of payments    3.31   4.93   5.37    3.75
Memorandum:
Current account
     (percent of GDP)   -4.61  -5.34 -3.13   -3.50
Amortization on medium-
     and long-term loans  35.15 19.11 14.13  30.17
International reserves
      (end of period)  35.90 37.32 42.00  42.00
Source:  Banco Central do Brasil and UBS Warburg.
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will be financed entirely by the inflow of FDI. (The
projection of an increased deficit as a percentage of
GDP reflects the depreciation of the real, which re-
duces the dollar value of Brazilian GDP or, if you
prefer to look at it that way, increases the local cur-
rency value of the current account deficit.)
Since there will be no increase in debt, one might
think that the debt indicators must be going to im-
prove. Unfortunately this is incorrect. Both exports
and GDP as measured in dollars are overwhelmingly
likely to decline in 2002, so both the traditional debt
indicators, debt/exports and debt/GDP, are going
to worsen. Anyone in the market who is searching
for reasons to be pessimistic about Brazil’s pros-
pects will be able to focus on the worsening of those
two indicators.
And debt ratios matter, because the mere fact
that the current account deficit will be covered by
the inflow of FDI does not mean that Brazil has no
financing problem. Far from it. As table 5 shows,
Brazil has to roll over about $30 billion a year of
medium- and long-term debt. If that had to be rolled
over on anything like the terms at which Brazilian
debt currently trades in the market, with a 1,759
basis point premium over US Treasuries, the inter-
est bill would explode, asymptotically to as much as
$35 billion per year. And an even more immediate
threat could be posed by bank reluctance to main-
tain their credit lines to Brazilian borrowers. There
were reportedly a few instances of banks cutting their
credit lines in early July 2002, but that threat then
seemed to have faded. It reportedly revived, with a
vengeance, after the panic initiated by Mr. O’Neill’s
remarks on July 28. When panic-driven cuts in credit
lines occurred before, after the devaluation of the
real in early 1999, the central bank negotiated a
collective agreement with foreign commercial banks
under which these agreed to maintain their credit
lines, but of course in those days there was an ad-
ministration in Washington that was prepared to lean
on US commercial banks in order to help bring a
panic under control.
If the IMF agreement indeed succeeds in avert-
ing crisis in the short run, then the longer-term pro-
jection appears rather favorable. Simply projecting
the past rate of improvement in the trade balance
shown in table 5 for a further year suggests a trade
surplus of some $15 billion in 2003, which would
give a noninterest current account surplus of $8
billion and a current account deficit of only $7 bil-
lion if the interest bill remains unchanged. That
would imply strongly improving trends in the debt
indicators, even if there were no further improve-
ments in the current account balance after 2003,
as there may not be if Brazilian growth indeed picks
up to 4 percent as projected. Anyone inclined to dis-
miss the projection of a $15 billion trade surplus in
2003 as fantasy should note that the surplus re-
ported in July 2002 was $1.2 billion, i.e., an annual
rate of $14.4 billion. All the projection assumes is
that the benefits of the recent additional real depre-
ciation of the real are not more than offset by the
pickup in Brazilian growth.
So once again it is pretty clear that Brazil faces
a situation of multiple equilibria. If lenders were pre-
pared to roll over their credits on terms broadly com-
parable to the existing ones, then Brazil would have
no problem in financing itself over the coming year
or two. If it does no more than stabilize its trade
position as growth recovers, then its debt indica-
tors would progressively improve. As the real ap-
preciated in real terms back toward its equilibrium
level, the debt indicators would also look a lot bet-
ter. Thus a good equilibrium would be entirely pos-
sible.
But so is a bad equilibrium. If the markets con-
tinue to be spooked by political fears, they will be
able to look to short-term worsening of the debt in-
dicators to rationalize a decision to refuse to roll
over debts on reasonable terms. In that case Brazil’s
situation will become impossible even without capi-
tal flight, some of which also has to be expected
under these circumstances.
Many economists have argued that a real crisis
is impossible with a floating exchange rate. It is cer-
tainly true that a floating rate removes one major
If the IMF agreement indeed
succeeds in averting crisis
in the short run,
then the longer-term projection
appears rather favorable.
Both exports and GDP as measured
in dollars are overwhelmingly likely
to decline in 2002, so both the
traditional debt indicators,
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source of vulnerability, namely the threat that a fixed
rate will be subjected to speculation that the fixed
rate cannot be sustained. But it shows a certain lack
of imagination to think that this is the only way in
which a financial crisis can be initiated. If a cur-
rency depreciates to a point where private-sector
debtors are unable to service their existing debts,
then they will default. Unless one imagines that credi-
tors will view default with equanimity, there will be
a crisis. Foreign credits will be cut off, and that can
strangle trade, as was observed in both Indonesia in
1998 and Argentina in 2002, when in both cases
exports fell drastically despite the countries being
hyper price-competitive. It would be a tragedy if the
lesson that a crisis is perfectly possible without a
fixed exchange rate is demonstrated at the expense
of the people of Brazil.
4. Brazilian Politics
The 2002 depreciation of the real and the decline
in the price of Brady bonds that signaled the explo-
sive growth of “Brazil risk” began in early May, shortly
after the public opinion polls in Brazil first indicated
a strong possibility that Lula would win the presi-
dential election. Since then the markets have reacted
negatively to every new poll indicating a setback to
the chances of the candidate of the governing party,
José Serra. If the markets are being spooked by the
fear that a victory by Lula, or perhaps by Ciro Gomes,
would jeopardize the continued servicing of Brazil’s
debts, it is obviously critical to examine the political
scenario in Brazil.
Since its emergence from military dictatorship
in the first half of the 1980s, Brazil has acquired a
large array of political parties. Most of these tend to
have vaguely left-wing names (which are always re-
duced to acronyms) and to engage in somewhat left-
wing rhetoric, but in practice they usually act in a
rather conservative way. President Fernando
Henrique Cardoso’s PSDB (Partido Social
Democrático Brasileiro, or the Brazilian Social Demo-
cratic Party) provides a good example. Before taking
office Professor Cardoso wrote articles about depen-
dency theory, and President Cardoso still likes to
speak as an exponent of the Third Way, as befits the
leader of a party describing itself as social demo-
cratic, but his government is generally regarded in
Brazil as having been rather right-wing. He is widely
denounced for having succumbed to the Washing-
ton Consensus, or neoliberalism (two concepts that
are often equated in Brazil, to the distress of the
present author who originally used the word con-
sensus to emphasize that various loony bits of the
neoliberal agenda had been discarded although other
items like external opening and privatization had
indeed won wide acceptance). But President
Cardoso’s problems with the Brazilian Congress have
been overwhelmingly in getting it to approve reforms
that could be expected, for example, to improve in-
come distribution. The Brazilian Congress is much
like the US Congress in being stuffed full of politi-
cians whose main mission it is to try and defend the
access of their friends to pork, and who therefore
resist measures that would help the less well-off,
who rarely have many friends in these circles.
One party stands out from the others as having
been founded to promote a distinctive ideology rather
than the interests of its founders. This is the PT, the
Partido dos Trabalhadores, i.e. the Workers’ Party.
It was created in 1980 by trade unionists in São
Paulo, led by Luís Inácio Lula da Silva, generally
known as Lula, who has been the leader of the party
ever since and is now contesting his fourth presi-
dential election on behalf of the party. The party’s
core is still the industrial working class, most of
which is far from affluent but nonetheless earns an
above-median income in Brazil. And, like most par-
ties based on the industrial working class, its ideol-
ogy has always been socialist.
Lula was born in Pernambuco, a state in the poor
northeastern part of the country, but his family mi-
grated to São Paulo when he was a child. He re-
ceived only minimal formal education, but subse-
quently took a technical course in metallurgy and
then worked two decades as a metallurgical worker.
He became a trade unionist in the mid-1960s even
though those were the days of the military dictator-
ship when unions were persecuted. He soon became
a union leader, and led a series of strikes in São
Paulo during the years that the power of the dicta-
torship was ebbing. In 1980 he helped found the PT,
and was subsequently elected to Congress. In 1989
he became the PT’s candidate for the presidency, as
he was again in 1994, 1998, and now in 2002. He
graduated from sports shirt and jeans to neat suits,
lost a lot of weight, and traveled the world. Although
the PT has run a number of city and state govern-
ments, his own administrative experience is limited
to that of running a trade union and a party.
At this stage there are two other serious candi-
dates in the Brazilian presidential election that is
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due to be held in two rounds in October, with the
first round of voting taking place on October 6. As-
suming (as is expected) that no candidate gets a
majority of the vote in the first round, the two can-
didates with the highest votes will go forward into a
second round of voting on October 27. One of those
two candidates is virtually certain to be Lula. The
other will be either José Serra, of the PSDB, or Ciro
Gomes, of the PPS (the Partido Popular Socialista,
or Popular Socialist Party), with the latter distinctly
more likely as this is written according to the pub-
lic opinion polls.
José Serra comes from São Paulo. Like many
Brazilian politicians, he spent many years in exile
during the military dictatorship that grabbed power
in 1964. He used this time to acquire academic quali-
fications, first in industrial planning at CEPAL in
Chile, and then in economics, first at the Univer-
sity of Chile and subsequently at Cornell. He also
taught at the University of Chile and was a member
of the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton for
two years, where he worked with the legendary
Albert Hirschman. After returning to Brazil he spent
a time as secretary of economics and planning of
the state of São Paulo, was twice elected a deputy
for that state, subsequently a senator, and has been
minister of planning and the budget, and subse-
quently minister of health, in the Cardoso govern-
ment. During his time in the latter post he has pre-
sided over one of the most rapid declines in infant
mortality the world has ever seen, over an antismok-
ing campaign far sharper and considerably more
effective than any the United States has yet at-
tempted, and over what is generally rated as one of
the world’s more effective anti-AIDS campaigns
(which included forcing reluctant foreign companies
to license anti-AIDS drugs to local Brazilian com-
panies so that they could be provided at a fraction
of the cost of the imported products).
Ciro Gomes can also boast a dazzling career.
While he too was born in Brazil’s industrial heart-
land of São Paulo, he comes from an old political
family from the poor northeastern state of Ceará, to
which his family moved back when he was an in-
fant. He studied law and became a professor of tax
law and public finance for a brief period, before his
political career pushed these commitments aside.
He was elected a state Deputy in Ceará at the age of
24, the mayor of its capital city, Fortaleza, six years
later, and the governor of the state only two years
after that. While governor he was awarded (jointly
with his predecessor) a UNICEF prize for Ceará’s
progress in improving child health. He resigned from
being governor in 1994 in order to act as interim
national finance minister for 4 months, shortly af-
ter the initiation of the Plano Real, during which
time he faced down a threat to reintroduce wage
indexation in the auto industry by slashing the tar-
iffs on imported cars. Since then he has studied at
Harvard, acted as author, speaker, and consultant,
and was a minor candidate for the presidency in
1998. He emerged rather suddenly from again be-
ing a minor candidate to his current position as
one of the leading contenders for the presidency in
July 2002.
To judge by their resumés, Brazil is rather for-
tunate to enjoy a choice between three such distin-
guished candidates for the presidency. Why should
the markets have panicked at the prospect of one of
them becoming president?
Unfortunately, one cannot say that this is com-
pletely irrational. Consider first the PT and its can-
didate Lula. In the 1980s they spoke approvingly of
repudiating Brazil’s debts. They were slow to en-
dorse the Plano Real. As recently as December 2001
the PT issued a program that spoke of “breaking
with the current economic model, which is based
on opening the market and radical deregulation, and
the consequent subordination of the dynamic of the
national economy to the interests and whims of glo-
bal financial capital” (PT 2001, para 1). It promised
to revise external tariffs so as to promote import
substitution, to regulate the entry of speculative
capital, and to reorient foreign direct investment so
as to compensate for the increase in the value of
profits, dividends and royalties (ibid, para 49). It
spoke of denouncing the existing agreement with
the IMF and auditing and renegotiating the exter-
nal debt (ibid, para 51). It proposed various initia-
tives that would have expanded state activity, and
said these would be financed by “a complete revi-
sion of the policy of giving priority to the payment
of debt service” (ibid, para 60). While one may sym-
pathize with some of these attitudes, such as the
promise to regulate inflows of speculative capital, it
is hardly surprising that foreign investors (or, for
that matter, domestic capitalists) should have taken
fright at the prospect of a party with such a policy
agenda coming to power.
Ciro Gomes has a reputation
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Or consider Ciro Gomes. (One does not need to
consider the PPS, because unlike the PT this is not
a disciplined political party with a coherent team
making policy. Ciro is pretty much a one-man band,
supported by the Brazilian/Harvard lawyer and phi-
losopher Roberto Mangabeira Unger and a ragbag
of supporters from many parties and with wide dif-
ferences in ideological positions.) He too has a record
of having favored debt default in the past (see
Giambiagi 2002 for an account of an interview he
gave in 1999 in which he affirmed his willingness
to declare a unilateral moratorium to permit a re-
negotiation of the debt). More recently he has spo-
ken of debt restructuring, albeit voluntary restruc-
turing to lengthen the maturity of the debt (the sort
of restructuring that Domingo Cavallo was attempt-
ing to secure in Argentina when his world collapsed).
At one stage he refused to contemplate entering
into an agreement that might help secure IMF back-
ing to reduce the dangers of the transition. He too
has been denouncing the neoliberalism of the gov-
ernment. His program for growth appears to be
based on the comforting conviction that during his
government a double Say’s Law will operate, so that
demand will create its own supply and supply will
create its own demand. He has talked of changing
the system of inflation targeting to one where the
central bank would be instructed to try to mini-
mize Okun’s “misery index”, i.e., an average of in-
flation and unemployment. His political program
calls for introducing plebiscites to allow him to over-
ride Congress any time they disagree and reorga-
nizing the federal structure of the country. He has
a reputation in some quarters of being mercurial
and unreliable, of changing his mind when it is
politically expedient. So when the polls said that
Ciro Gomes is the most likely alternative to Lula, it
is perhaps not altogether surprising that the mar-
kets should have tanked again.
José Serra is, in contrast, the candidate of the
government, the one who can be relied on to per-
petuate the policies of the past eight years that most
foreigners, if not most Brazilians, seem to think have
served the country rather well. Until April 2002, most
people in the financial markets assumed that he
would win. The polls might show Lula ahead, as they
had shown him ahead of Cardoso in 1994, but when
it came to the second round he would be able to rely
on the innate conservatism of the majority of Brazil-
ian voters to win. (And conservatism on the part of
the poor is not necessarily irrational in the Brazilian
context: the PT represents the interests of the in-
dustrial working class, not the poor, whose prime
interest is to avoid any revival of the inflation that
so penalized them for 30 years before 1994.) But
this reasoning overlooked the weaknesses of Serra
as a candidate. To begin with, he does not succeed
in creating the impression that he enjoys kissing
babies. And to crown it, in May he tried using Brazil’s
economic vulnerability as a tactic into scaring vot-
ers away from Lula, by suggesting that Brazil might
suffer Argentina’s fate if they were to elect Lula in-
stead of him. Most Brazilians feel, correctly in my
view, that there are such significant differences be-
tween the situation in Brazil today and that in Ar-
gentina a year ago that this is what an Englishman
like me would describe as not being cricket.
To be specific, Brazilians will tell you that the
differences between Argentina and Brazil include:
• Vastly greater social cohesion. While Brazilians
are like most of the rest of the human race in
being skeptical of their politicians, there is none
of the feeling that they are being systematically
ripped off by the political class that poisons any
plan of action in Argentina.
• A far greater willingness to pay taxes, which
amount to 34 percent of GDP in Brazil as against
15 percent in Argentina.
• Absence of any significant use of the dollar to
denominate internal debt contracts in Brazil,
which means that currency devaluation does not
threaten the financial solvency of large parts of
the corporate sector and banking system as it
did in Argentina.
A PT government would face
 a problem of inexperience
in governing at the national
level, but that it would compound
 its problems by deliberately
stoking a financial crisis
seems most unlikely.
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• A healthy banking system (yes, due in part to
past bailouts, but bailouts that have already
happened and whose cost is therefore included
in the debt statistics).
• A stronger fiscal situation, with the high debt/
GDP ratio of the moment reflecting an overshoot-
ing of the exchange rate that has already hap-
pened.
• Substantial privatizable assets (including half
of Petrobras and all the power generating sec-
tor) still in the hands of the public sector in Bra-
zil, whereas almost everything conceivably
privatizable had already been sold off in Argen-
tina.
• Center-state fiscal relations that have been suc-
cessfully reformed during the Cardoso govern-
ment. Central grants are based on objective and
progressive formulae rather than the traditional
horse-trading. The states are now subject to hard
budget constraints and are in fact running fis-
cal surpluses, rather than the provincial defi-
cits effectively unconstrained by rules that pre-
vailed in Argentina.
• A much less brittle macroeconomic policy regime,
with a floating exchange rate coupled with a suc-
cessful policy of inflation targeting instead of a
currency board with a peg to a totally inappro-
priate currency.
This is a set of powerful differences. But unfor-
tunately there is also one important similarity,
namely the fact that both are sufficiently highly in-
debted externally to be vulnerable to a loss of confi-
dence by the international capital market. And the
fact that Argentina ultimately defaulted despite hav-
ing had its policy regime lauded for a decade by the
international powers-that-be makes life far more dif-
ficult for its neighbor, and partner, Brazil. If Argen-
tina could ultimately be forced into doing what it
tried so hard to avoid, and where everyone who mat-
tered claimed it was doing all the right things, can
they be certain that a Brazil run by a president with
a past record of sympathizing with default will not
take the easy way out?
There are of course no certainties in this busi-
ness. Nevertheless, the assumption that either Lula
or Ciro Gomes would be likely to seek a debt recon-
struction seems implausible.
This is clearest with respect to Lula. The pro-
gram of the coalition supporting Lula (which is wider
than, though dominated by, the PT), issued in July
2002, is unambiguous in declaring that a Lula gov-
ernment “would not break contracts or revoke es-
tablished rules” (Coligação Lula Presidente 2002,
p.17). It promises to preserve the primary surplus
and if necessary even raise it sufficiently further to
avoid increases in the debt/GDP ratio. It commits
a Lula government to preserving the policy of infla-
tion targeting.
Why should anyone believe these promises
rather than the earlier less reassuring ones? Per-
haps because to win power the PT is already hav-
ing to try and appeal to the median voter, and to
turn around after the election and try and force
the Congress (in which it will not command any-
thing like a majority) to endorse a debt repudiation
would set it up for a battle from which it could not
hope to emerge with an ounce of credibility. Or else
because one may be aware of how many other so-
cialist parties around the world, from Willy Brandt’s
social democrats in Germany to Tony Blair’s Labour
Party in Britain to Felipe Gonzalez’s socialists in
Spain to Ricardo Lagos’s socialists in Chile to the
former communist party in Poland that presided
over the Polish economic boom of the mid-1990s,
have already trodden this path. Or else one may be
impressed by the professional, relatively clean and
modern way in which the PT has governed a raft of
Brazilian cities and states in recent years, without
a hint of Neanderthal fire-breathing socialism. Ob-
viously a PT government would face a problem of
inexperience in governing at the national level, but
that it would compound its problems by deliber-
ately stoking a financial crisis seems most unlikely.
It is less easy to be confident of how a govern-
ment led by Ciro Gomes would behave. He has a
reputation for unpredictability and for changing his
mind. Defenders may claim that this is part of the
art of being a good politician, but the concern is
whether it would make him as good at running a
government as at getting elected. Nevertheless,
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there are two reasons for believing that he too would
be unlikely to initiate a debt restructuring that was
not forced on him. One is that his record when ac-
tually in power in Ceará belies the reputation he
has built for himself when in opposition: he acted
pragmatically, responsibly, and intelligently, indeed
some say he showed brilliance. The other reason for
doubting whether he would act irresponsibly is that
as he has moved from being a marginal candidate to
being the man to beat, he has attracted a retinue of
more orthodox supporters than those on whom he
had to rely when his electoral prospects appeared
bleak. It is far from clear that this process is now
exhausted: if he did indeed beat José Serra, it seems
quite likely that some of those now in power would
be prepared to work for him, and would be welcomed
by him, and they would act as a restraining influ-
ence.
Specifically, they could be relied on to set out
before him a more realistic cost-benefit analysis of
the results of a debt reconstruction than any he had
available when making the off-the-cuff remarks that
have so spooked the markets. The Brazilian public
sector owes something like $76 billion abroad other
than to the multilateral institutions. If the face value
of this were reduced in line with recent market prices,
it would be reconstructed with an equivalent face
value of $40 billion, which would save interest of
about $3 billion a year on the external accounts,
plus maybe another $5.5 billion in amortization pay-
ments, which would be significantly less than the
projected improvement in next year’s trade balance.
It would also reduce the burden of debt service on
the budget by around R$25 billion a year. That is
significant, but a reduction in the burden of the do-
mestic debt is far more important in this context.
But if anything like an equivalent reduction in the
value of Brazil’s domestic debt were to be engineered,
then the banks (which hold about 30 percent of their
assets in the form of claims on the public sector)
would need bailing out again, unless the govern-
ment decided that bank depositors should be re-
quired to bear the burden of reducing the value of
the debt. A new bank bailout would much reduce
the benefit to the public finances of the debt recon-
struction. If the government attempted to avoid all
the confusion that a new bank bailout would engen-
der by exempting the banks from the requirement
to write down the value of their assets, one can imag-
ine that a long queue of other applicants would re-
quest similar treatment. The arbitrary upsetting of
debtor/creditor relationships that would be inevi-
table in any discriminating debt reduction exercise
would undermine the basic ethic of a market
economy that Brazil has been developing, as well as
redirecting attention away from the real economy
modernization that the country needs toward a se-
ries of financial battles. Debt reconstructions some-
times become inevitable, but to imagine that they
are an easy short cut to rapid growth is wishful think-
ing. On the contrary, experience to date suggests
that one would be likely to usher in a strong reces-
sion.
 A far more promising way of cutting the burden
of domestic debt, and one that would be delayed
rather than enhanced by a debt restructuring, is to
reduce the level of domestic interest rates. Table 4
showed that the projected burden of the Selic-linked
debt will still be enormous in the medium term un-
less something changes. In fact, there seems a good
chance that the level of domestic interest rates in
Brazil could drop to its lowest level in many years if
Brazil emerges from the current crisis without a debt
restructuring. Ironically, they might drop furthest
under a Lula government that showed itself to be
responsible, because the market’s ever-present fear
of a PT government renouncing Brazil’s debts would
be once and for all laid to rest.
Hence it seems unlikely that any of the three
candidates would choose to walk away from Brazil’s
debts. That is not to say that they would be pre-
pared to make unlimited sacrifices to maintain debt
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service: it is to say that, if they are offered the good
equilibrium, it is unlikely that any of them would
decide to upset the apple cart.
5. So Is Brazil Next?
Sections 2 and 3 concluded that Brazil would
be capable of servicing its debts in a sustainable
way if the markets give it a chance by again start-
ing to supply loans on reasonable terms and avoid-
ing a new collapse of the exchange rate. Section 4
concluded that none of the candidates for the presi-
dency would be rational in seeking a debt recon-
struction. So how can one explain the fact that the
real depreciated even further and Brazil risk rose
even more while this brief was being written, until
the IMF program was announced?
By far the most convincing explanation is that
the markets were gripped by panic and no one was
prepared to act on the sort of analysis laid out above.
Even those who agreed with the line of reasoning
were afraid that to speculate in favor of the good
equilibrium might expose them to further losses as
the market continued its rush to the cliff edge.
If that is correct, then Brazil could in principle
be saved by either of two routes, the first originat-
ing in the private sector and the second in the offi-
cial sector. The private route would involve enough
market actors deciding that they were prepared to
take a risk and bet in favor of a recovery. Foreign
financial institutions would recognize that they
stand to make a lot of money by speculating in fa-
vor of the real, if indeed it recovers to anything like
equilibrium. Investors could see the current low
prices of Brazilian assets as offering an opportunity
to buy at bargain basement prices. (With Brady
bonds selling for under 60 cents on the dollar, there
was scope for a price appreciation of over 50 per-
cent if Brazil recovers without a debt reconstruc-
tion.) The international credit rating agencies could
look at the analysis in this brief and decide that it
justifies upgrading Brazil’s credit rating, if they were
prepared to make a radical break with their tradi-
tional practice of providing a lagging indicator by
mechanically downgrading every country that en-
counters market turbulence. Brazilian firms could
refuse to cover their dollar liabilities by buying dol-
lars at the exorbitant price currently prevailing in
the foreign exchange market, and Brazilian residents
could desist from trying to move wealth offshore.
Foreign banks could renew their credit lines so that
Brazilian firms would no longer be under the same
pressure to buy dollars to cover their positions. If
enough actors acted in these ways, then they would
all have made a lot of money by defeating the forces
of panic that had driven the real to such an under-
valued level and Brazilian assets to such low prices.
The trouble was that they faced a collective ac-
tion problem in that they have no mechanism for
bringing them together to achieve the good equilib-
rium. It is one purpose of government to resolve such
collective action problems. The traditional way for
official actions to stem a panic involves a central
bank acting as lender of last resort by standing ready
to lend at a penalty rate against good collateral. The
closest analogy we have to this mechanism at the
international level is the IMF, which traditionally
has lent to countries in trouble once it has assur-
ance that their policies are consistent with eventual
recovery. At one time an IMF program was regarded
as a “good housekeeping seal of approval” and was
expected to initiate a prompt resumption of inter-
national capital flows to the country involved. Un-
fortunately that can no longer be relied on, although
the recovery of the real on August 1 after Mr. O’Neill
said that he was prepared to support a new IMF
package, and the reaction to the package on August
8, suggests that it still retains considerable potency.
In the event Brazil and the IMF announced that
they had agreed on a new 15-month program on
August 7, just as this brief was being finalized. The
program involves $30 billion of IMF finance, about
7½ times Brazil’s IMF quota, making it large rela-
tive to the size of the country as well as the largest
Of the $30 billion IMF loan,
$24 billion would be disbursed
only in 2003, after the new
government takes office, and will
therefore be subject to the
new government continuing
to satisfy the conditionality agreed
by the current government.
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absolute program in Fund history. Of this $30 bil-
lion,  $24 billion would be disbursed only in 2003,
after the new government takes office, and will there-
fore be subject to the new government continuing
to satisfy the conditionality agreed by the current
government. The main element of this is the main-
tenance of a primary surplus of at least 3.75 per-
cent of GDP. In addition, the program provides for
a $10 billion reduction in the reserve floor immedi-
ately the program is agreed by the Fund Board (ex-
pected to be in early September), adding that much
extra to the funds potentially available to defend
the real before the election.
Will this program succeed in bringing a perma-
nent change in market sentiment toward Brazil, and
thus allow the country to achieve the good equilib-
rium? The program does not provide for any formal
endorsement by the opposition candidates in the
presidential election, on the model of the Korean
program of 1997 and as called for by Truman (2002).
Nevertheless, its success or failure will surely de-
pend on whether both Lula and Ciro Gomes con-
vince the financial markets that they would stick
to its terms if elected. If they indeed allow them-
selves to be bound by the current fiscal targets,
then fears that they might end up unable to service
the debt despite an intention to do so would be laid
to rest. The absence of a demand for explicit en-
dorsement, like the absence of a demand for a yet
bigger primary surplus, may have been calculated
to ease their way to an implicit acceptance that will
not be seen as an unacceptable provocation to their
more radical supporters. (The absence of a require-
ment that the primary surplus be further increased
in the depths of the current recession is also good
economics; what would have been really nice would
have been an agreement to maintain the primary
surplus constant in cyclically adjusted terms when
recovery comes, which would secure an even larger
primary surplus and hence a rapid reduction in the
country’s vulnerability during the next boom.) But if
either of the serious opposition candidates under-
mine the notion that they are giving even an implicit
endorsement, the outlook for Brazil is not good. The
international community through the IMF can help
countries that are helping themselves; it is impo-
tent to help those that lack the cohesion to endorse
a program that promises to restore viability in the
medium term.
So is Brazil next? The chances of it pulling
through without the need for a debt restructuring
and the chaos that would bring are now much bet-
ter than they appeared to be when I began writing
this brief, but they still depend on two conditions
being satisfied:
•    Implicit acceptance of the conditionality of the
IMF program by both the main opposition can-
didates.
• That the appraisal that Brazilian fundamentals
are in relatively good shape carries conviction
with the financial markets, so that the current
situation is seen as a favorable time to buy into
Brazil rather than any recovery being viewed as
an opportunity to cut and run.
tral bank estimates the private sector to have net
external debts of the order of $120 billion, which is
partly or largely offset by private holdings of exter-
nal assets, but this offset is not included in table 1
because these assets are not in practice available to
the authorities. (Deutsche Bank estimates a much
higher figure, $173 billion.)
Public-sector domestic debt is estimated as
R$677 billion on August 8, 2002. This takes the debt
stocks reported by the Banco Central on June 30,
makes what looks like a reasonable allowance for
growth in the debt stock since then, revalues the
dollar-linked portion of the debt in proportion to the
devaluation of the real between June 30 and August
8, and does not net out R$71 billion (on June 30) of
Table 1 lays out the assumptions that are being made
about those variables that are being treated as fun-
damentals in the analysis of this brief. This appen-
dix describes why the particular values in the table
were selected.
Debt Stocks
At the end of June 2002 Brazil’s public sector
had $98 billion of external debt but this was par-
tially offset by assets of $42 billion of reserves, leav-
ing a net external debt of $56 billion on the part of
the public sector. I assume that this figure did not
change subsequently, which is surely untrue in de-
tail but nonetheless the changes are likely to have
been relatively small and partly offsetting. The cen-
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assets of the public sector in the form of claims on
BNDES and other arguably illiquid assets. The to-
tal does, however, net out something over R$100
billion of other claims, such as central bank hold-
ings of government debt and government holdings
of bank deposits.
Total public-sector debt is the sum of $56 bil-
lion of net external debt, worth R$164 billion at
R$2.92 = $1, and the R$677 billion of internal debt.
Growth Rate
A figure of 4 percent per year was selected as
the basic assumption for the trend growth rate of
the economy. This is above the average growth rate
since the Plano Real was launched in 1994, which
has been 2.9 percent per year. However, a series of
crises (in Asia, that which led up to the devaluation
of the real, the crisis in Argentina, and now the
renewed crisis in Brazil) have pulled the growth rate
down, and Brazil has grown significantly faster in
crisis-free periods. The Banco Central do Brasil es-
timates the supply side to be capable of a trend
growth rate of 4.5 percent per year. The PT has pro-
claimed a growth target of 5 percent per year. The 4
percent figure therefore looks reasonably conserva-
tive.
Inflation
The inflation target proclaimed by the Banco
Central do Brasil is 3.5 percent in 2003 and there-
after.
Equilibrium Exchange Rate
Estimates put this in the range of 1.9 reais per
dollar to 2.5 reais per dollar. (Since the relevant
concept of the exchange rate for defining equilib-
rium is the real effective exchange rate rather than
the nominal bilateral rate against the dollar, these
equilibrium figures will vary with third-party ex-
change rates and relative inflation rates. However,
these differences are likely to be small enough in
the short run relevant for crisis management to jus-
tify the simplification of focusing on the dollar rate.)
Goldman Sachs 1.9 reais per dollar
Ilan Goldfajn (2002) 2.2 reais per dollar (average
real rate over last 15 years).
Deutsche Bank 2.5 reais per dollar.
Primary Fiscal Surplus
A surplus of 3.75 percent of GDP has been as-
sumed, in line with government commitments for
the future. This commitment has been explicitly
endorsed by the PT. The actual primary surplus was
3.5 percent of GDP in 2000 and 3.7 percent in 2001.
The augmented primary surplus used in the text adds
the interest on the assets that were not netted off in
developing our measure of the debt, giving a figure of
4.2 percent.
Noninterest Current Account Balance
A near equivalent to the concept of the primary
fiscal surplus in the balance of payments context is
the current account balance excluding interest pay-
ments. An estimate of what this will be in 2002-03 is
based on the data in table 5, and is shown in the
final two columns of that table.
This shows that trade was in surplus by $2.6
billion in the first six months of 2002, which is the
same as in the second half of 2001. That was achieved
despite a decline in exports to Argentina of about
$1.3 billion between the first four months of 2001
and the first 4 months of 2002, i.e. a decline of $4
billion per year. Extrapolating this rate of improve-
ment in the trade balance forward to reflect the con-
tinuing results of the present hypercompetitive ex-
change rate, one may estimate the trade balance as
likely to be around $4.6 billion in the second half of
2002, $6.6 billion in the first half of 2003, and $8.6
billion in the second half of 2003. That would give a
trade surplus of $7 billion in 2002 and $15 billion in
2003 (as shown in the final columns of table 5). Since
the trade surplus reported in July 2002 was $1.2
billion, this projection appears conservative.
All other items except “Other Services and In-
come” are projected to remain unchanged, after
rounding, from those in the most recent 12-month
period. But these other services are showing a
strongly improving trend, so a further improvement
to a deficit of $4 billion in 2002 and $3 billion in
2003 is projected.
These assumptions yield a noninterest current
account that is almost in balance, with a deficit of a
mere $1 billion, in 2002. If the projection of a strongly
improving trade account continues to hold good, the
outlook in 2003 is for a trade surplus of some $15
billion, and hence a noninterest current account
surplus of $8 billion.The views expressed in this publication are those of the author. This publication is part of the overall
program of the Institute, as endorsed by its Board of Directors, but does not necessarily reflect
the views of individual members of the Board or the Advisory Committee.
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